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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

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1			
2			
3			
4			
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(See inside cover)

CONTROL NO. Z-14077/83

NPIC/IEG (9/83)


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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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NPIC/IEG (9/83)

16 SEPTEMBER 1983

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE RELOAD CAPABILITY
PACIFIC FLEET, USSR (SWN)

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1. **SIGNIFICANCE:** THE SOVIETS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE ABILITY TO LOAD THE THREE CLASSES OF NUCLEAR-POWERED BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES (SSBN; D-III, D-I, AND Y-I) ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC FLEET USING AMGA-CLASS MISSILE TENDERS (AEM). THIS ACTIVITY OCCURRED BETWEEN JULY AND EARLY SEPTEMBER 1983 AT PETROPAVLOSK K NAVAL MISSILE LOADING FACILITY. (SWN)
2. **REMARKS:** THE SOVIETS HAVE THREE AMGA AEM IN THEIR INVENTORY WITH TWO IN THE PACIFIC FLEET AT PETROPAVLOSK AND ONE IN THE NORTH FLEET. RECENT D-III SSBN MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY CONFIRMS THE ABILITY OF THE "DAUGAVA", THE THIRD UNIT OF THE AMGA CLASS, TO HANDLE THE SS-N-18 SLBM. AMGA-CLASS AEM HAVE PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSESSED AS BEING ABLE TO HANDLE SS-N-8 AND SS-N-6 SLBM. THE "DAUGAVA" DIFFERS FROM THE OTHER TWO UNITS OF THE CLASS IN SEVERAL RESPECTS. THE "DAUGAVA" IS LONGER THAN THE OTHER TWO UNITS AND HAS A SOLID RATHER THAN A LATTICE-CONSTRUCTED CRANE. THE CRANE HAS A 5-METER GREATER REACH AND IS CAPABLE OF LIFTING HEAVIER LOADS. IN ADDITION, THE TWO MAIN HATCHES ON THE "DAUGAVA" ARE LONGER THAN THOSE ON UNITS 1 AND 2. THESE DIFFERENCES MAY HAVE BEEN MADE TO FACILITATE SS-N-18 SLBM HANDLING. (SWN)

D-III/SS-N-18 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY -- MISSILE TRANSFER OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE SS-N-18 SLBM WERE IN PROGRESS

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[REDACTED] A D-III WAS BERTHED OUTBOARD THE "DAUGAVA". AN SS-N-18 MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS ON THE PIER NEXT TO THE AEM AND AN SS-N-18 MISSILE AIRFRAME WAS SUSPENDED FROM THE AEM'S CRANE (GRAPHIC 1 OF 2, BOTTOM). ALTHOUGH BOTH OF THE MAIN HATCHES OF THE AEM WERE OPEN, THE MISSILE TRANSFER WAS PROBABLY BETWEEN THE MISSILE TRANSPORTER AND THE D-III. [REDACTED] (GRAPHIC 1 OF 2, TOP), A D-III SSBN WAS AGAIN BERTHED OUTBOARD THE "DAUGAVA". ONE MISSILE TUBE DOOR ON THE SUBMARINE WAS OPEN WITH AN SS-N-18 MISSILE AIRFRAME SUSPENDED FROM THE CRANE OF THE AEM OVER THE TUBE. NO MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS PRESENT AND

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NPIC/IEG (9/83)

16 SEPTEMBER 1983

THE FORWARD HATCH OF THE AEM WAS OPEN, SUGGESTING THAT THE MISSILE WAS STORED ONBOARD THE AEM OR WAS TO BE TRANSFERED INTO THE AEM. [REDACTED] (NOT ON GRAPHICS), THE "DAUGAVA" WAS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSFER OF SS-N-18 MISSILE AIRFRAMES. AN SS-N-18 TRANSPORTER WAS ON THE PIER, THE CRANE OF THE AEM WAS ELEVATED, AND ITS AFT HATCH WAS OPEN. (SWN)

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D-I/SS-N-8 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY -- [REDACTED] A D-I SSBN WAS BERTHED OUTBOARD THE "DAUGAVA" (GRAPHIC 2 OF 2, TOP). THE CRANE OF THE AEM WAS ELEVATED OVER ITS OPENED FORWARD HATCH, AND NO MISSILE TRANSPORTERS WERE PRESENT AT THE PIER. THE ABSENCE OF A MISSILE TRANSPORTER AND THE OPEN HATCH SUGGESTS THAT THE MISSILE WAS TO BE TRANSFERED EITHER TO, OR FROM, THE AEM. (SWN)

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Y-I/SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSFER ACTIVITY -- SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSFER OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE "DAUGAVA" WERE IN PROGRESS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A Y-I SSBN WAS BERTHED ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE PIER FROM THE AEM (GRAPHIC 2 OF 2, BOTTOM). ONE OF THE MISSILE TUBE DOORS WAS OPEN AND THE CRANE WAS EXTENDED OVER THE MISSILE BAY. ALTHOUGH BOTH HATCHES ON THE AEM WERE OPEN, AN SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS RETURNING TO THE MISSILE STORAGE AREA INDICATING A PROBABLE TRANSFER BETWEEN THE Y-I AND THE TRANSPORTER USING THE CRANE OF THE AEM. [REDACTED] A Y-I SSBN WAS AGAIN BERTHED ACROSS THE PIER FROM THE AEM (NOT ON GRAPHICS). TWO MISSILE TUBE DOORS WERE OPEN AND THE CRANE WAS TURNED TOWARD THE SUBMARINE. BOTH HATCHES ON THE AEM WERE CLOSED AND AN SS-N-6 MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS AT THE FOOT OF THE PIER. [REDACTED] ANOTHER Y-I WAS BERTHED ACROSS THE PIER FROM THE AEM AND THE CRANE WAS TURNED TOWARD THE SUBMARINE (NOT ON GRAPHICS). HOWEVER, THE CRANE OBSTRUCTED THE VIEW OF THE REAR OF THE MISSILE BAY. BOTH HATCHES WERE CLOSED AND NO MISSILE TRANSPORTER WAS PRESENT. (SWN) [REDACTED]

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3.

COORDINATES 52-57-12N 158-25-52E

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